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Abstract This note describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with
both private and public sector employment and non-convex labor supply. In addition, when
households are constrained to search for jobs only in a certain sector, the framework requires
that there should be separate insurance markets: a public and a private sector one, which would
pool the unemployment risk of the corresponding group of households. The unemployment in-
surance market segmentation is a new result in the literature and a direct consequence of the
non-convexity of the labor supply in each sector and the sorting effect of the sector-type shock
introduced in the model setup.
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1. Introduction
Changes in hours account for approximately two-thirds of the cyclical output volatility
in the standard real business cycle model (Cooley and Prescott 1995, Kydland 1995).
Those hours, however, are assumed to be supplied in the private sector only, and thus
the private-public sector labor choice is ignored. While this might be a reasonable as-
sumption for the US economy, it comes in a stark contrast with the European Union
(EU) evidence—after all, central governments in EU countries are the biggest employ-
ers at a national level, and public employment is a significant share of total employ-
ment.
This note adds to the literature by distinguishing between the two types of labor
supply decisions by focusing on the fact that most of the volatility in hours is driven by
volatility in employment. That is, most workers in Europe are employed full-time and
in addition, only very rarely move between public and/or private sector, as documented
in Gomes (2012).1 Thus, the non-convex labor supply decisions (either work a full
week on a job, or not work at all) in both sectors are taken under scrutiny, and the note
will try to uncover whether this double binary labor supply decision could provide new
implications for business cycle fluctuations in different EU member states.
* CERGE-EI Affiliate Fellow, Prague; Department of Economics, American University in Bulgaria, 1
Georgi Izmirliev Sq., Blagoevgrad 2700, Bulgaria. Tel.: 00 359 73 888 482, E-mail: avasilev@aubg.edu.
1 In the setup, we model this lack of mobility between sectors via a shock process that sorts workers into a
private-sector or a public-sector type.
Czech Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 91
A. Vasilev
In an earlier paper, Vasilev (2015a) extends Rogerson’s (1988) and Hansen’s (1985)
static setup by augmenting it with a public sector, and introducing a shock that deter-
mines each household’s type to be either private-sector or public-sector. The house-
holds then search for work in the sector corresponding to their type. Vasilev (2015a)
then aggregates over individual households’ utility functions, and finds that the result-
ing utility representation features constant, but different disutility of labor in the two
sectors. The aggregate utility function then can not only accommodates the fact that
average public sector wages feature a significant mark-up over private sector ones,
as documented in Vasilev (2015b), but also allows for an additional transmission and
propagation mechanism of shocks through the endogenous public sector labor choice.
In contrast to this earlier study, the focus of the present note falls on the lottery- and
insurance-market equilibrium for the setup in Vasilev (2015a). When households in the
setup are constrained to search for jobs only in one of the two sectors, in equilibrium
there should be separate insurance firms: one for the public sector and another for the
private sector, where each insurance company would pool the unemployment risk of the
corresponding group of workers. This insurance market segmentation is an important
new result in this literature, and is due to the presence of the double non-convexity, as
well as the sorting effect of the sector-type shock in the model setup.
2. Model setup
The model follows Vasilev (2015a). The theoretical setup is a static economy, where
agents face a non-convex decision in a two-sector economy. There is a large number of
identical one-member households, indexed by i and distributed uniformly on the [0,1]
interval. The households will be assigned a sector “type,” and after the type is revealed,
each one decides whether to work in that sector or not. In the exposition below, we
will suppress the index i to save on notation.
2.1 Households
Each household maximizes the following utility function
max
{c,hp,hg}

ln(cη +Sη)
1
η +α ln(1−hp−hg), (2.1)
where c,S,hp,hg denote household’s private consumption, consumption of the public
good, hours worked in the private sector, and hours worked in the government sector.
The parameter α > 1 measures the relative weight of leisure in the utility function.
Total consumption is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of private
consumption and consumption of government services, where η > 0 measures the
degree of substitutability between the two types of consumption.2
2 The separability of consumption and leisure is not a crucial assumption for the results that follow. A more
general, non-separable, utility representation, does not generate new results, while significantly complicates
the algebraic derivations, and thus interferes with model tractability.
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Each household is endowed with 1 unit of time that can be allocated to work in
the private sector, work in the government sector, or leisure, so hp+ hg ≤ 1. Labor
supply in each sector is discrete hp ∈ {0,hp}, hg ∈ {0,hg}, where hp ≤ 1, hg ≤ 1, and
h
p
+h
g
> 1. In other words, working full-time in both sectors is infeasible, as it takes
more than the total time available. Thus, the paper is consistent with Gomes (2014),
who assumes that looking for a job will follow a “directed search” process: Each
household decides in each period whether to go to the public or to the private sector
(or, alternatively, is assigned a “sector type”). This process is stochastic and has two
realizations. The probability of going to the private sector (or being a “private-sector
type”) is
q=
H p
H p+Hg
, (2.2)
where uppercase letters denote aggregate quantities, i.e. H p denotes aggregate hours
in the private sector, and Hg are the aggregate hours worked in the public sector. Then
the probability of being a public sector type is
1−q= H
g
H p+Hg
. (2.3)
This process is i.i.d. across individuals, so the Law of Large Number holds: At the
aggregate level, q share of the households will be private sector type (and thus each
household of this type would thus choose hg = 0, as it searches for work only in the
private sector), and 1−q share will be public sector type (and thus each household of
this type would thus choose hp = 0, as it searches for work only in the public sector).3
Once the particular sector-type is determined, each household decides on its labor sup-
ply accordingly. Note that the setup is quite general and allows for different wage rates
per hour worked in the two sectors.
In addition to the work income, households hold shares in the private firm and
receive profit share pi , with
 1
0 pidi=Π.4 Income is subject to a lump-sum tax t, where 1
0 tdi= T . Therefore, each household’s budget constraint is
c j ≤ w jh j+pi− t, j = p,g. (2.4)
Households act competitively by taking the wage rates {wp,wg}, aggregate outcomes
{S,H p,Hg} and lump-sum taxes {T} as given. Each household chooses {c j,hp,hg} to
maximize (2.1) s.t. (2.2)–(2.4).
3 So the labor supply choice in a sector different from the type of the respective household is degenerate, as
it will never be positive.
4 This is a technical assumption which would guarantee a positive consumption to either of the two types,
even if they choose not to work in their sector.
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2.2 Firms
Next, there is a single firm producing a homogeneous final consumption good, which
uses labor H p as the only input. The production function is given by
Y = F(H p), F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0, F ′(H p) = 0,
where the last assumption is imposed to proxy a capacity constraint. The firm takes
{wp}, aggregate outcomes {S,Hg} and policy variable {T} as given, and chooses
{H p} to
max
H p
F(H p)−wpH p s.t H p ≥ 0.
2.3 Government
The public authority hires Hg employees to provide public services, which are paid
wg = γwp, with γ ≥ 1, as in the EU, average public sector wages feature a mark-
up over private sector ones (Vasilev 2015b). The production function of non-market
public services is as follows:
S= S(Hg), S′ > 0, S′′ < 0, S′(Hg) = 0,
where the last assumption guarantees that not all “public-sector types” will work in the
production of the public good. The public sector wage bill is financed by levying a
lump-sum tax T on all households, or wgHg = T . The government takes Hg as given,
and sets wg, as a fixed gross mark-up above wp, while T is residually chosen to ensure
budget balance.
Vasilev (2015a) establishes that in equilibrium, given an initial realization of a type-
specific shock, a fraction λ p of the private-sector-type households would be working
in the private sector, where cpw denotes consumption of those working, and c
p
n denotes
consumption of those not working. Similarly, a fraction λ g of the public-sector-type
households would be working in the public sector and consuming cgw, while the public-
sector types will be enjoying cgn. Alternatively, the workers would be participating
in a sector-specific lottery with the proportions representing the probability of being
selected for work. Conditional on the sector type, a household would receive the same
income in expected terms.
Alternatively, we can introduce insurance markets, and allow households to buy
insurance, which would allow them to equalize the actual income received, conditional
on the sector-type. Given the difference in the wages and hours worked across sectors,
segmented insurance markets are needed in order to provide actuarially fair insurance.
2.4 Insurance markets
Insurance markets is segmented, with one representative company per sector.5 Insur-
ance costs q j per unit, j= p,g, and provides one unit of income if the household is not
5 The insurance market segmentation is a direct effect of the discreteness of the labor supply in each sector
and the sorting done by the sector-type shock.
94 Czech Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2
Insurance-Markets Equilibrium with Double Indivisible Labor Supply
working. We can think of insurance as bonds that pay out only in case the household
is not chosen for work. Thus, household will also choose the quantity of insurance
to purchase b j, j = p,g. With sector types, the setup requires that the insurance mar-
ket is segmented, with public sector insurance market insuring only public-sector-type
households, and the private sector insurance market insuring only private-sector-type
households.
Without segmentation, insurance will not be actuarially fair, one of the groups will
face better odds versus price, the company will not be able to break even, and/or at least
one type of households will not be able to buy full insurance, which would completely
smooth consumption across employment states, given the non-convexity constraint of
labor supply.
As pointed out in Hansen (1985), the plausibility of this insurance market segmen-
tation result depends crucially on the fact that probabilities λ p and λ g are perfectly
observable to everyone, and that the contracts written are perfectly enforceable. Also,
who has won and who has lost the lottery is assumed to be perfect knowledge. Lastly,
everyone will always announce truthfully the same λ p (λ g) to the private (public) firm
and the private-sector (public-sector) insurance company.
2.4.1 Private-sector insurance company
The private-sector insurance company maximizes profit. The company only services
private-sector types. It receives revenue if a private-sector-type household is working
and makes payment if it is not. More specifically, the proportion of people working in
the private sector contribute towards the unemployment benefits pool, which are then
distributed of benefits to the unemployed in that sector. The amount of insurance sold
in the private sector is a solution to the following problem: Taking qp∗(i) as given,
bp∗(i) solves
max
bp
λ p∗(i)qp∗(i)bp− [1−λ p∗(i)]bp.
With free entry profits are zero, hence
λ p∗(i)qp∗(i)bp− [1−λ p∗(i)]bp = 0.
This condition implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual in the private
sector.
2.4.2 Public-sector insurance company
The public-sector insurance company also maximizes profit. The company only ser-
vices public-sector types. It receives revenue if a public-sector-type household is work-
ing and makes payment if it is not. More specifically, the proportion of people working
in the public sector contribute towards the unemployment benefits pool, which are then
distributed of benefits to the unemployed in that sector. The amount of insurance sold
in the public sector is a solution to the following problem: Taking qg∗( j) as given,
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bg∗( j) solves
max
bg
λ g∗( j)qg∗( j)bg− [1−λ g∗( j)]bg
With free entry profits of the insurance company operating in the public sector are also
zero since
λ g∗( j)qg∗( j)bg− [1−λ g∗( j)]bg = 0.
This implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual of a public sector type.
In the next section, the equilibrium with lotteries and no insurance markets is pre-
sented and discussed first, and then the setup is extended to incorporate a regime with
insurance.
3. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with lotteries
3.1 Definition of the DCE with lotteries
A competitive equilibrium with lotteries in the private and public sector for this eco-
nomy is a list:
cp∗w (i),c
p∗
n (i),λ
p∗(i)

,

cg∗w ( j),c
g∗
n (g),λ
g∗( j)

,h f∗,wp∗,wg∗, p∗,pi∗
s.t.
(i) Private-sector consumer maximization – taking wp∗, pp∗,pi∗ as given, for each
private-sector type household i, cp∗w (i), cp∗n (i), λ p∗(i) solve:6
max
λ p,cpw,c
p
n
λ p(i)

ln[(cpw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hp)

+
+(1−λ p(i))

ln[(cpn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

s.t. p∗[λ p(i)cpw+(1−λ p(i))cpn ] = wp∗hpλ p(i)+pi∗− t,
cpw ≥ 0, cpn ≥ 0, 0< λ p(i)< 1.
(ii) Public-sector consumer maximization – taking wg∗, pp∗,pi∗ as given, for each
public-sector type household j, cg∗w ( j), cg∗n ( j) , λ g∗(i) solve
max
λ g,cgw,c
g
n
λ g( j)

ln[(cgw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hg)

+
+(1−λ g( j))

ln[(cgn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

6 Note that now when they trade lotteries the outcome is no longer deterministic. Now consumers maximize
expected utility, i.e. if a private sector type is chosen to work with probability λ p, that individual will get
expected income λ pwphp.
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s.t. p∗[λ g( j)cgw+(1−λ g( j))cgn] = wg∗hgλ g( j)+pi∗− t,
cgw ≥ 0, cgn ≥ 0, 0< λ g( j)< 1.
(iii) Firm maximization – taking p∗, wp∗ as given, h f∗ solves
maxh p∗ f (h)−wp∗h
s.t. h≥ 0,
and
pi∗ = p∗ f (h f∗)−wp∗h f∗.
(iv) Government – taking p∗, wp∗, and pi∗ as given, government provides public
services according to the following production function
S= S(λ g∗hg∗)
The government sets wg∗ = γwp∗. Finally, T is residually set to ensure
wg∗λ g∗hg = T.
(v) Market clearing: 
i
λ p∗(i)hpdi = h f∗,
i

λ p∗(i)cp∗w (i)+(1−λ p∗(i))cp∗n (i)

di+
+

j

λ g∗( j)cg∗w ( j)+(1−λ g∗( j))cg∗n ( j)

d j = f (h f∗).
3.2 Characterization of the DCE with lotteries
Private-sector types problem is:
L= λ p(i)

ln[(cpw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hp)

+(1−λ p(i))

ln[(cpn)
η +Sη ]1/η

−µ

p∗λ p(i)cpw+ p
∗(1−λ p(i))cpn −wp∗hpλ p(i)−pi∗+ t

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FOCs:
cpw : λ
p(i)
1
[(cpw)η +Sη ]
(cpw)
η−1 = µ p∗λ p(i) (3.1)
cpn : (1−λ p(i))
1
[(cpn)η +Sη ]
(cpn)
η−1 = µ p∗(1−λ p(i)) (3.2)
λ p(i) :

ln[(cpw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hp)

−

ln[(cpn)
η +Sη ]1/η

−µ

p∗cpw− p∗cpn −wp∗hp

= 0 (3.3)
(3.1) and (3.2) show that cpw = c
p
n , ∀i. Also, λ p(i) = λ p, ∀i. Then (3.3) simplifies to
α ln(1−hp) =−µwp∗hp.
Hence,
wp∗ = f ′(λ p∗hp∗) =
α ln(1−hp)[(cpw)η +Sη ]
(cpw)η−1h
p .
This equation is a discrete version of the marginal product of labor equals the marginal
rate of substitution. It implicitly characterizes the optimal λ p.
Public-sector types problem:
L= λ g( j)

ln[(cgw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hg)

+(1−λ g( j))

ln[(cgn)
η +Sη ]1/η

−ν

p∗λ g( j)cgw+ p
∗(1−λ g( j))cgn−wg∗hgλ g( j)−pi∗+ t

FOCs:
cgw : λ
g( j)
1
[(cgw)η +Sη ]
(cgw)
η−1 = ν p∗λ g( j) (3.4)
cgn : (1−λ g( j))
1
[(cgn)η +Sη ]
(cgn)
η−1 = ν p∗(1−λ g( j)) (3.5)
λ g( j) :

ln[(cgw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hg)

−

ln[(cgn)
η +Sη ]1/η

−ν

p∗cgw− p∗cgn−wg∗hg

= 0 (3.6)
(3.4) and (3.5) show that cgw = c
g
n, ∀ j. Also, λ g( j) = λ g, ∀ j. Then (3.6) simplifies to
α ln(1−hg) =−νwp∗hp.
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Hence,
wg∗ = γ f ′(λ p∗hp∗) =
α ln(1−hg)[(cgw)η +Sη ]
(cgw)η−1h
g .
This equation is a also the discrete version of the marginal product of labor equals
the marginal rate of substitution. In this case it implicitly characterizes the optimal λ g.
Note that it is optimal for the benevolent government point of view to choose randomly
λ p, λ g and to introduce uncertainty. With randomization, choice sets are convexified,
and thus market completeness is achieved.
Since a household of either type can be chosen to work with some probability, the
households are exposed to risk. Hence it would be optimal to have insurance. The
government can then sell employment lotteries, and individuals will buy insurance to
cover the risk of being unemployed (not being chosen for work). With insurance,
however, the employer pays wage to individuals only if they work. That is, instead
of working with expected income, we will work with actual income. This allows to
extend the commodity space in the model framework and include insurance markets.
4. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium with lotteries and insurance markets
4.1 Definition of the DCE with insurance markets
A competitive equilibrium with lotteries and unemployment insurance is a list
cp∗w (i),c
p∗
n (i),λ
p∗(i),bp∗(i)

,

cg∗w ( j),c
g∗
n (g),λ
g∗( j),bp∗( j)

,h f∗,wp∗,wg∗, p∗,
qp∗,qg∗,pi∗
s.t.
(i) Private-sector-type household maximization – taking wp∗, pp∗,pi∗ as given, for
each private-sector type household i, cp∗w (i),cp∗n (i),λ p∗(i),b∗(i) solve
max
λ p,cpw,c
p
n
λ p(i)

ln[(cpw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hp)

+
+(1−λ p(i))

ln[(cpn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

s.t. p∗cpw+b
pqp∗(i) = wp∗hp+pi∗,
p∗cpn = b
p+pi∗,
cpw ≥ 0, cpn ≥ 0, 0< λ < 1,
or
p∗cpw+ p
∗qp∗cpn = w
p∗hp+(1+pi∗)qp∗.
Foe each household in the private sector, there are two states: a household is
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buying unemployment insurance when working, receiving a payout when not
working, hence in equilibrium bp∗ = λ p∗wp∗hp∗.
(ii) Public-sector-type household maximization – taking wg∗, pp∗,pi∗ as given, for
each public-sector-type household j, cg∗w ( j),cg∗n ( j),λ g∗( j),bg∗( j) solve
max
λ g,cgw,c
g
n
λ g( j)

ln[(cgw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hg)

+
+(1−λ g( j))

ln[(cgn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

s.t. p∗cgw+b
gqg∗(i) = wg∗hg+pi∗,
p∗cgn = b
g+pi∗,
cgw ≥ 0, cgn ≥ 0, 0< λ g < 1,
or
p∗cpw+ p
∗qp∗cpn = w
p∗hp+(1+pi∗)qp∗.
Foe each household in the public sector, there are two states: a household is
buying unemployment insurance when working, receiving a payout when not
working, hence in equilibrium bg∗ = λ g∗wg∗hg∗.
(iii) Firm maximization – taking p∗,w∗ as given, h f∗ solves
max
h
p∗ f (h)−wp∗h,
s.t. h≥ 0,
and
pi∗ = p∗ f (h f∗)−wp∗h f∗.
(iv) Insurance companies. Insurance markets is segmented, with one company per
sector.
(a) Private sector. Taking qp∗(i) as given, bp∗(i) solves
max
bp
λ p∗(i)qp∗(i)bp− (1−λ p∗)bp
With free entry profits are zero, hence
λ p∗(i)qp∗(i)bp− (1−λ p∗(i))bp = 0.
This implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual in the private
sector.
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(b) Public sector. Taking qg∗( j) as given, bg∗( j) solves
max
bg
λ g∗( j)qg∗( j)bg− (1−λ g∗( j))bg
With free entry profits of the insurance company operating in the public
sector are also zero since
λ g∗( j)qg∗( j)bg− (1−λ g∗( j))bg = 0.
This implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual of a public
sector type.
(v) Government – taking p∗, wp∗, and pi∗ as given, government provides public
services according to S = S(λ g∗hg∗). The government sets wg∗ = γwp∗, and
taxes T are residually set to ensure
wg∗λ g∗hg = T.
(vi) Market clearing. 
i
λ p∗(i)hpdi= h f∗,
i
[λ p∗(i)cp∗w (i)+(1−λ p∗(i))cp∗n (i)]di+

j
[λ g∗( j)cg∗w ( j)+(1−λ g∗( j))cg∗n ( j)]d j= f (h f∗).
4.2 Characterization of the DCE with insurance markets
Private sector consumer problem:
max
λ p,cpw,c
p
n ,bp(i)
λ p(i)

ln[(cpw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hp)

+
+(1−λ p(i))

ln[(cpn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

s.t. p∗cpw+ p
∗qp∗cpn = w
p∗hp+pi∗+qp∗pi∗.
Normalize p∗ = 1.
cpw : λ
p (c
p
w)
η−1
[(cpw)η +Sη ]
= pµ
cpn : (1−λ p)
(cpn)η−1
[(cpn)η +Sη ]
= pqpµ
Optimal λ p (λ p(i) = λ p, ∀ j) is implicitly characterized by the zero-profit condition
from the private sector insurance company:
λ p
1−λ p =
1
qp
(4.1)
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The price of insurance depends on probability of the event you are insuring against.
We cannot force qp∗(i) = qp∗ although ex post that would indeed be the case. For the
insurance firms, profits are linear in qp. This implies that profits cannot be positive or
negative in equilibrium. Zero profits in the private sector insurance market then mean
qp = 1−λ
p
λ p . A common interpretation for both insurance companies is that this price of
the insurance is the odds ratio, or the ratio of probabilities of the two events.
Combining then with the FOCs for state-contingent consumption, we obtain that
cpw = c
p
n , ∀i. That is, private-sector-type households buy full insurance to smooth con-
sumption perfectly.
Similarly, for the public sector consumers:
max
λ g,cgw,c
g
n
,bg( j)λ g( j)

ln[(cgw)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1−hg)

+
+(1−λ g( j))

ln[(cgn)
η +Sη ]1/η +α ln(1)

s.t. cgw+q
g∗cgn = w
g∗hg+pi∗+qg∗pi∗.
cgw : λ
g (c
g
w)
η−1
[(cgw)η +Sη ]
= pν
cgn : (1−λ g)
(cgn)η−1
[(cgn)η +Sη ]
= pqgν
Optimal λ g (λ g( j) = λ g, ∀ j) is implicitly characterized by the zero-profit condition
from the public sector insurance company:
λ g
1−λ g =
1
qg
Combining then with the FOCs for state-contingent consumption, we obtain that cgw =
cgn, ∀ j. Also, λ g( j) = λ g, ∀ j. That is, public-sector-type households buy also full
insurance to equalize consumption in the two states (employed vs. unemployed). In
particular, when income is stochastic, i.e., it is uncertain whether the individual will be
employed, we need insurance markets for each sector type. In this economy there is no
uncertainty (after the types are revealed) but it is optimal to introduce insurance mar-
kets. This is because of the non-convexity of the choice set, which is similar to having
incomplete markets. Lotteries can then be introduced to achieve market completeness.
Therefore, randomization may be optimal in a non-convex environment even though
there is no aggregate uncertainty.
5. Conclusions
This note describes the lottery and insurance market equilibrium in an economy with
both private and public sector jobs and non-convex labor supply decision faced by the
workers. In addition, when households are constrained to search for jobs only in a
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certain sector, the framework requires that there should be separate insurance markets:
public and private sector one, which would pool the risk of the corresponding group
of workers. In equilibrium, conditional on the sector-type, each household would fully
insure against the uncertainty in terms of the employment status (but cannot insure
against the “type” shock). The unemployment insurance market segmentation is a
direct effect of the discreteness of the labor supply in each sector and the sorting done
by the sector-type shock.
The plausibility of the result derived in the paper depends crucially on the fact that
probabilities λ p and λ g are perfectly observable to everyone, and that the contracts
written are perfectly enforceable. Also, who has won and who has lost the lottery is
assumed to be perfect knowledge. Lastly, everyone will always announce truthfully
the same λ p (λ g) to the private (public) firm and the private-sector (public-sector)
insurance company. Therefore, whether and how this insurance-market segmentation
can be implemented in reality is not entirely clear at this point.
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